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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW'S LOOSE CANON: 
ARE WE RUNNING SOFfW ARE WITHOUT 
AN OPERATING SYSTEM? 
Donald E. Lively* 
The canon of constitutional law, like any fundamental prin-
ciple, is a function of the values that inspire it. If a meaningful 
learning experience is the overarching concern, the common de-
nominators of constitutional law casebooks should reveal the 
canon's general shadings. Insofar as casebook authorship until 
recently was the province of a relative few, the canon's analysis 
and indexing have been a rather hierarchical enterprise. Recent 
trends in publishing, however, have expanded the sources of and 
opportunities for definition. Among other things, these devel-
opments have complicated the ability to monitor the canon or 
track its permutations. 
Although the market ultimately has limits to the amount of 
mass distributed hard copies it can absorb, the forces of elec-
tronic interactivity and utility are coalescing toward reducing the 
significance of these barriers. Expanded access to electronic 
data bases already has freed instructors, in theory if not always 
in practice, from the procrustean hold of standardized source 
materials. With the publishing industry itself aggressively en-
couraging instructors to generate individualized casebooks,1 
autonomous selection is emerging as a realistically convenient 
and viable alternative to authoritative selection. 
To the extent editing and usage become more coextensive, 
the canon's definition may be subject to dynamics that are more 
populist than elitist. Decentralization of the editorial process 
presumably creates the potential for higher diversification and 
innovation quotients. Whether an expanded community of 
• President, Founding Dean and Professor, Florida Coastal School of Law. 
1. West Publishing Company, for instance, has developed and is actively market-
ing systems that enable law professors to construct customized case books from their own 
materials. 
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authors affects the canon in ways that formally register depends 
upon the capacity of or opportunity for self-generated distribu-
tions to travel beyond closed circuits. At a minimum, greater in-
dividualized control over course material construction multiplies 
the possibilities for recalibrating the canon at the user level. 
With more fermenting sources in the definitional mix, albeit 
in a less visible way, the possibility arises that a broader range of 
inputs may yield a more multifaceted canon or even competing 
canons. Constitutional law traditionally has been noted for its 
special capacity to facilitate intellectual growth and develop-
ment. Depending upon their backgrounds, interests, and aims, 
instructors may discern the opportunities that core constitutional 
courses present for professional skills development. An unset-
tling factor, even at schools where students have strong tradi-
tional quality indicators, is a widespread impoverishment of 
knowledge with respect to history and other contextual under-
girdings that are prerequisites for a meaningful constitutional 
law learning experience. 
These deficiencies confront legal educators generally, and 
constitutional law instructors in particular, with an unwelcome 
dilemma that may have significant implications for the canon. 
An idealized curriculum would proceed safely upon the assump-
tion that secondary and tertiary education had prepared students 
for a reasonably sophisticated inquiry into constitutional princi-
ples and theories. Expectations of such readiness are quickly 
dispelled at many institutions by asking simple questions on the 
first day of class, such as "what document contains the passage 
'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness?"'2 
Insofar as institutional disparities exist with respect to stu-
dent qualifications, the canon for practical purposes may have 
variable meaning. The extent of its fluidity, however, hinges 
upon the willingness of instructors to assume enrichment or re-
medial responsibilities. Fidelity to a fixed canon, in a context of 
diverse competencies, competes against the reality that law 
schools not only educate but certify the professional fitness of 
their graduates. Assuming that a law school's certification at-
tests to more than a vocational and technical proficiency in the 
law, it is difficult to escape a sense of obligation to enhance the 
basis for a congruent learning opportunity and experience. 
2. Contrary to the belief of many first-year law students, the answer is not the 
United States Constitution. 
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Against this backdrop, it may be perversely symmetrical 
that a foundational learning need intersects one of the canon's 
weaker links. To the extent values inspire the law, and the Con-
stitution is the overarching statement of popular will, historical 
context is crucial for purposes of understanding the document's 
framing and development. If history is accepted as a corner-
stone of the canon, moreover, race must be regarded as an es-
sential pillar. The canon in its current incarnation typically 
compartmentalizes race as a classification implicating discrete 
constitutional provisions. A legal system of racial management, 
however, is the hinge upon which the Constitution's and union's 
viability originally turned. As James Madison noted, the pri-
mary source of division among the states during the framing pro-
cess was not: 
size, but ... other circumstances; the most material of which 
resulted partly from climate, but principally from (the effects 
of) their having or not having slaves. These two causes con-
curred in forming the great division of interests in the 
U[nited] States. It did not lie between the large ~and] small 
states: it lay, between the Northern [and] Southern. 
The union's founding, through the accommodation of slav-
ery, is a bedrock reality from which more than two centuries of 
constitutional doctrine and principle have evolved. Despite the 
persistence of race as an agent for defining, reinventing, and 
growing the union, many casebooks have prioritized or focused 
upon racial and constitutional intersections of the past half cen-
tury. Limited or underdeveloped historical context in part may 
respond to external forces that challenge content manageability. 
Even as classroom time opportunity remains fixed, the body of 
case law, lengthy opinions, and fragmented decisions continue to 
multiply. The result is a heavily stressed editorial process that 
must make difficult choices and painful cuts. Given the scarce 
resources of time and space, and annual increases in raw mate-
rial tonnage, it is tempting to regard editorial selection as a zero 
sum process. Compression of an expanding universe, however, 
does not necessarily preordain that context and perspective 
should be casualties. 
Escape routes from the bind include a strategic separation 
of basic principles from their traditional associations, so that 
3. M. Farrand, ed., 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 486 (Yale 
U. Press, 1937). 
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they may be viewed through a wider angle lens. The viability of 
this strategy, as a means of connecting fundamental constitu-
tional principle to illuminating historical reality, is testable 
against even the most basic elements of the canon. Whatever 
debate may exist with respect to the canon's margins, it is doubt-
ful that many would dispute that the cases of Marbury v. Madi-
son,4 Lochner v. New York,5 and Brown v. Board of Education6 
are within its core. Perhaps consistent with the notion that it is a 
"derelict[ ] of constitutionallaw"7 or its status as "the most fre-
quently overturned decision in history,"8 the Court's decision in 
Dred Scott v. Sandfortl generally travels in an orbit that is dis-
tant from the canon. These deprecations alone would seem to 
establish the basis for canonical striping, if only to provide a ref-
erence point for what constitutes normative principle and to 
stimulate inquiry into the rhymes behind such repetition. As a 
source of exposure to the power of judicial review, substantive 
due process, and regimens of racial management, the Dred Scott 
ruling rivals the established points of entry into those areas. At 
minimum, it provides the basis for an amplified understanding of 
the principles set forth in Marbury, Lochner, and Brown, and a 
more layered and nuanced sense of connectivity with founda-
tional premises. 
The Marbury decision is the classic starting point for a basic 
course in constitutional law and, more specifically, insight into 
the concepts of separation of powers and judicial review.10 The 
intrinsic value of the Court's pronouncement in Marbury is un-
deniable. Given Chief Justice Marshall's sensitivity to President 
Jefferson's likely response to a Court ordered remedy, the 
opinion illuminates some critical interbranch realities. Despite 
the decision's utilities, instructors must draw upon other cases to 
point up and develop the debate over the judiciary's reach. The 
discourse between Justices Iredell and Chase five years before 
4. 5 u.s. 137 (1803). 
5. 198 u.s. 45 (1905). 
6. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
7. Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 Tulane L. Rev. 979, 989 
(1987), quoting Philip Kurland, Politics, the Constitution and the Warren Court 186 (U. 
Chicago Press, 1970). 
8. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Race Racism and American Law 21 (Little, Brown and Co., 
1973). 
9. 60 u.s. 393 (1856) 
10. An exception to this norm is exemplified by Daniel A. Farber, William N. Esk-
ridge, Jr. and PhilipP. Frickey, Constitutional Law: Themes for the Constitution's Third 
Century (West, 1998). 
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Marbury, in Calder v. Bull,11 is a common departure point for 
this accounting. 
It does not diminish the seminal value of Marbury to con-
sider and perhaps conclude that the Dred Scott decision is an 
equally if not more efficient opportunity for exploring the power 
of judicial review and its potential radiations. The case has the 
virtue of more multidimensional constitutional linkages, includ-
ing racially significant founding concerns. By declaring the Mis-
souri Compromise unconstitutional, the Court in Dred Scott for 
the first time since Marbury overturned a federal law.12 More 
dramatically than Marbury, the Dred Scott decision reveals the 
potential for institutional marginalization as a function of reac-
tion to the Court's output. Contrary to President Jefferson's 
battle-ready position, President Buchanan pronounced the slav-
ery issue "a judicial question, which legitimately belongs to the 
Supreme Court of the United States, before whom it is now 
pending, and will, it is understood, be speedily and finally set-
tied. "13 
Misplaced hope that the Court would resolve conclusively 
an issue that had paralyzed the political process, eventually de-
volved into a reaction that actualized Chief Justice Marshall's 
worst nightmare. The decision effectively was nullified by the 
Lincoln Administration's calculated neglect of it.14 Having been 
defined as "the citadel of slaveocracy," the Court was punished 
by the downsizing of its membership and influence. Such inter-
stitial consequences, which concerned Chief Justice Marshall, 
sealed Chief Justice Taney's reputation. The Dred Scott decision 
may not have been the proximate cause of the union's rupture. 
To the extent its dismantling was achieved in significant part by 
force of arms and constitutional amendment, however, the rul-
ing's aftermath affords a rare illumination of the people's ulti-
mate power to repudiate, undo, and recast their system of gov-
ernance. 
11. 3 u.s. 386 (1798). 
12 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 452. 
13. Donald E. Lively, Foreshadows of the Law: Supreme Court Dissents and Con-
stitutional Development 16-17 (Praeger,1992). 
14. President Lincoln maintained that the judgment controlled the outcome for the 
parties but did not become general law until it became "fully settled." Don Fehren-
bacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics, 442 (Oxford 
U. Press, 1978). 
15. Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Supreme Court From Taft to Warren 16 (Louisi-
ana State U. Press, 1968). 
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Although Chief Justice Marshall announced the Court's 
power "to say what the law is,"16 the Marbury narrative does not 
etch the contours of this authority or establish the possible refer-
ence points for its utilization. Theories of judicial review, par-
ticularly those concerning judicial identification and develop-
ment of textually unenumerated rights and liberties, typically are 
explored within the purview of substantive due process analysis. 
Primary immersion into the subject typically occurs in connec-
tion with the Court's generation of and accounting for economic 
rights during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
One year after minimizing the Fourteenth Amendment's racial 
significance/7 the Court in Allgeyer v. Louisiand8 referenced the 
same provision in vitalizing contractual liberty as a check on 
state power. This development is a common preview of the 
Lochner era of economic rights enshrinement through interpre-
tation of the due process clause in substantive terms. 
The possibilities of substantive due process review were fac-
tored and foretold when Chief Justice Taney found that a "right 
of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the 
Constitution. "19 As Taney saw it, a federal law depriving slave 
owners of their property rights "could hardly be dignified with 
the name of due process of law."20 As predicates for his finding 
that a "right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly af-
firmed in the Constitution,''21 he referenced founding clauses ac-
counting for the slave trade22 and fugitive slaves.23 Although he 
did not coin the phrase that eventually emerged in Griswold v. 
Connecticut,24 Chief Justice Taney thus introduced the concept of 
"penumbras." 
The Dred Scott decision may not approach the intensity or 
richness of Justice Peckham's, Harlan's, and Holmes' competi-
tion in Lochner over the validity or applicability of substantive 
due process review. Its multidimensional qualities and capacity 
to illuminate original and future realities, however, make it a 
creditable amplifying agent. These traits, to the extent choices 
16. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 37,177 (1803). 
17. In 1896, the Court upheld official segregation and formally constitutionalized 
the separate but equal era. Plessy v. Ferguson,163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
18. 165 u.s. 578, 587-88 (1897). 
19. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 383,451 (1956). 
20. Id. at 450. 
21. ld. at 451. 
22. Id. at 411,451. 
23. Id. at 411,451-52. 
24. 381 u.s. 479,483 (1965). 
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must be made in setting up the topic of substantive due process, 
at least make Dred Scott a worthy alternative to cases more 
commonly used as preliminary agents. 
The Court's determination that formal segregation was "in-
herently unequal," 25 in Brown v. Board of Education, is a pri-
mary focal point for examining the convergence of racial and 
constitutional reality. Attention to Brown is apt for purposes of 
delineating and explaining the passage from several decades of 
constitutionally endorsed official segregation. With the real con-
stitutional time invested in doctrine that accommodated or facili-
tated slavery, blunted the Reconstruction Amendments, and se-
cured the separate but equal doctrine, not to mention the 
constraints upon desegregation imposed within two decades of 
the mandate's pronouncement, a universe centered upon Brown 
has a false gravity. 
Understanding of the Brown decision often is swept away 
by rhetorical currents that, for instance, script it as the catalyst 
for "the Second American Revolution. "26 Given its backdrop 
and impact, the decision aptly might be characterized as another 
incremental repudiation of Dred Scott.TT Utilization of Brown 
without sufficient context or enrichment fosters an intellectually 
misplaced and professionally dangerous sense that the judiciary 
has a naturally friendly demeanor toward minority claims. It 
also facilitates a caliber of discourse that, consistent with general 
propensities when race becomes the topic of conversation in cul-
turally diverse settings, tends to be delicate and underdeveloped. 
A higher educational experience should transcend this societal 
norm. 
For most of its existence, the canon has been defined in a 
relatively controlled environment. Potential influences upon the 
canon's future evolution may be identifiable, but the nature and 
extent of their impact are less certain. At some level, the canon 
is bound to be affected by market redefinition, technology, new 
learning modalities, globalization, multiculturalism, deficiencies 
or disparities in the intellectual development of students, and as-
sessments of legal education's value and utility. 
Several years ago, the American Bar Association Section of 
Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar published a critical 
25. 347 u.s. 483, 495 (1954). 
26. Anthony Lewis, Ponrait of a Decade: The Second American Revolution (N.Y. 
Times, 1964). 
27. See note 12 and accompanying text. 
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perspective upon the skills and values training provided by law 
schools in the United States.28 The report responded to concerns 
that American legal education had become too distanced from 
the profession and indifferent toward student needs for training 
in skills and values essential for professional functionality. Not-
ing the practicing bar's lament that law school graduates "can't 
draft a contract [and] can't write," the report referenced "the 
traditional response[]" by legal educators that they do not offer 
a vocational education but teach students "how to think. "29 
Given the dual functions of law schools, a parallel inquiry into 
their academic focus and utility may be an equally useful and 
timely undertaking. Insofar as the canon courses into a future 
that includes the rigors of searching review, close connectivity 
with its historical predicates will offer significant evidence of in-
tellectual vitality. 
28. Legal Education and Professional Development-An Education Continuum, 
Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Oosing the Gap (ABA, 
1992). 
29. ld. at 4. 
